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Preserving Statistical Privacy in Distributed Optimization
Nirupam Gupta†, Shripad Gade⋆, Nikhil Chopra‡ and Nitin H. Vaidya†
Abstract— We propose a distributed optimization algorithm
that, additionally, preserves statistical privacy of agents’ cost
functions against a passive adversary that corrupts some agents
in the network. Our algorithm is a composition of a distributed
“zero-sum” secret sharing protocol that obfuscates the agents’
cost functions, and a standard non-private distributed optimiza-
tion method. We show that our protocol protects the statistical
privacy of the agents’ local cost functions against a passive
adversary that corrupts up to t arbitrary agents as long as
the communication network has (t + 1)-vertex connectivity.
Importantly, the “zero-sum” obfuscation protocol preserves the
sum of the agents’ objective functions and therefore ensures
accuracy of the computed solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed optimization over multi-agent peer-to-peer net-
works has gained significant attention in recent years [1].
In this problem, each agent has a local cost function and
the goal for the agents is to collectively minimize sum
of their local cost functions. Specifically, we consider a
system of n agents where each agent i has a local cost
function hi : R
m → R. A distributed optimization algorithm
enables the agents to collectively compute a minimizer,
x∗ ∈ argmin
x∈Rm
n∑
i=1
hi(x). (1)
We consider a scenario when a passive adversary can
corrupt some agents in the network. The corrupted agents
follow the prescribed protocol correctly, but may try to
learn the cost functions of other agents in the network. In
literature, a passive adversary is also commonly referred as
honest-but-curious. Prior work has shown that for certain
distributed optimization algorithms, such as the Distributed
Gradient Descent (DGD) method, a passive adversary may
learn about all the agents’ cost functions by corrupting only
a subset of agents in the network [2]. This is undesirable
especially in cases where the cost functions encode sensitive
information [3].
We present a privacy protocol, named the Function Sharing
(FS) protocol, wherein the agents obfuscate their local cost
functions with correlated random functions before initiating
a (non-private) distributed optimization algorithm. The pri-
vacy protocol was originally proposed by Gade et al. [2],
[4]. However, the prior work [2], [4] lacks a formal privacy
analysis. In this paper, we utilize statistical privacy definition
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developed by Gupta et al. [5], [6] for rigorously analyzing
privacy of FS protocol.
Although the differentially private (DP) distributed op-
timization protocols can provide strong statistical privacy
guarantees, DP protocols suffer from an inevitable privacy-
accuracy trade-off [7], [8]. That is, DP protcols can only
compute an approximation of the actual solution of the dis-
tributed optimization problem. Moreover, the approximation
error is inversely related to the strength of differential privacy
obtained. On the other hand, the FS protocol computes an
accurate solution to problem (1), while the strength of the
statistical privacy obtained can be desirably tuned.
Homomorphic encryption-based privacy protocols rely on
the assumption of computational intractability of hard math-
ematical problems [3], [9]. The privacy of these protocols
is built upon the assumption that the passive adversary has
limited computational power. On the other hand, we show
that the FS protocol provides statistical (or information-
theoretic [10]) privacy which is independent of the compu-
tational power of the adversary. This means that we do not
require the computation power of the passive adversary to
be limited.
Summary of Contributions
The FS protocol, elaborated in Section III, is a generic
approach for constructing a private distributed optimization
protocol. The protocol constitutes two phases:
(i) In the first phase, each agent shares independently
generated random functions with its neighbors. Agents
use both the sent and received random functions to
obfuscate (or mask) their private local cost functions.
The masked cost functions are called the effective cost
functions.
(ii) In the second phase, agents execute non-private DGD
algorithm utilizing only their effective cost functions. In
doing so, an agent does not share its private local cost
function with other agents.
Note that the privacy mechanism used in the first phase
is independent of the distributed optimization algorithm
executed by the agents in the second phase of the protocol.
Correctness Guarantee: As elaborated in Section III, the
sum of the effective cost functions of the agents is equal to
the sum of the private local cost functions of the agents.
Therefore, DGD executed by agents in the second phase
accurately computes the solution to the (original) distributed
optimization problem (see Theorem 1 in [2]).
Privacy Guarantee: As elaborated in Section III-A, the
privacy guarantee of the FS protocol states that the passive
adversary learns very little (statistically speaking) about the
local cost functions of the non-corrupted (or honest) agents,
as long as the agents corrupted by the passive adversary do
not form a vertex cut in the underlying communication net-
work topology. This means that the FS protocol protects the
statistical privacy of the honest agents’ local cost functions
against a passive adversary that corrupts up to t arbitrary
agents in the system as long as the communication network
topology has (t+ 1)-vertex connectivity.
The privacy guarantee holds regardless of the distributed
optimization algorithm used in the second phase. This is
shown by assuming the worst-case scenario where all the
effective cost functions of the honest agents are revealed to
the passive adversary in the second phase.
It is of independent interest to note that a variant of the FS
protocol is known to preserve the perfect statistical privacy
in distributed average consensus problem [11], [12].
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a scenario where a passive adversary, referred
as A, corrupts some agents in the network. Our objective is
to design a distributed optimization protocol that protects
the privacy of the non-corrupted agents’ local cost functions
against the passive adversary, while allowing the agents to
solve for the optimization problem (1) accurately. As the
adversary is passive (i.e. honest-but-curious), the corrupted
agents execute the prescribed protocol correctly.
The privacy definition below is built upon that in [11],
[12]. We fix some distributed optimization protocol Π to
formulate the privacy definition. Next, we define view of A
for an execution of Π as follows.
Definition 1: For a protocol Π, the view of A constitutes
the information stored, transmitted and received by the
agents corrupted by A during the execution of Π.
Privacy requires that the entire view of A does not leak
significant (or any) information about the private local costs
of the honest agents. Note that, by definition, A learns a
point x∗ ∈ argmin∑ni=1 hi(x), assuming it corrupts at least
one agent. A perfectly private protocol would not reveal any
information about the honest agents’ cost functions to A
other than their sum at x∗. For now, however, we relax the
perfect privacy requirement, and only consider the privacy
of the affine terms of the agents’ cost functions. Having said
that, our protocol can be extended easily for protecting the
privacy of higher-order polynomial terms of cost functions
as detailed in Section III-B.
We now introduce some notation. For an execution of Π,
suppose that C denotes the set of agents corrupted by the
adversary A, and H = {1, . . . , n} \ C denotes the honest
agents. For each agent i, the cost function hi(x) can be de-
composed into two parts; the affine term denoted by h
(1)
i (x),
and the non-affine term denoted by h†i (x). Specifically,
hi(x) = h
(1)
i (x) + h
†
i (x), ∀x ∈ Rm, i ∈ V . (2)
As the name suggests, the affine terms are affine in x. That
is, for i ∈ V there exists αi ∈ Rm and γi ∈ R such that,
h
(1)
i (x) = α
T
i x+ γi, ∀x ∈ Rm, (3)
where (·)T denotes the transpose. As constants γi’s do not
affect the solution of the optimization problem (1), the agents
need not share these constants with each other in Π. Hence,
the privacy of {γi, i ∈ H} is trivially preserved. In the
privacy definition below we ignore these constants, and only
focus on the affine coefficients {α1, . . . , αn}. Let,
A = [α1, . . . , αn] (4)
be the m× n-dimensional matrix obtained by column-wise
stacking of the individual agents’ affine coefficients. Suppose
that A corrupts a set of agents C. Then,
• ViewC(A) denotes the probability distribution of the
view of A for an execution of Π wherein the agents
have private cost functions with affine coefficients A.
Note that for preserving privacy, the protocol Π must intro-
duce some randomness in the system. As a consequence, the
view of A is a random variable. Moreover, deterministic view
is just a special case of a random variable and as a result the
above notation ViewC(A) makes sense under all scenarios.
The definition of privacy stated below is built upon the
notion of relative entropy, commonly known as the Kullback-
Leibler divergence (or KL-divergence). For a continuous
random variable R, let fR(r) denotes its probability density
function (or p.d.f.) at r ∈ R. The KL-divergence, denoted by
DKL, can be utilized to quantify difference between a certain
probability distribution f′R and the reference probability
distribution fR [13]. Specifically, the KL-divergence of f
′
R
from fR is defined as,
DKL (fR, f
′
R) =
∫
R
fR(s) log
(
fR(s)
f′R(s)
)
ds.
Let ‖.‖ denote the Euclidean norm for vectors and the
Frobenius norm for matrices. Next, we define privacy of
protocol Π against A that corrupts agents C in the network.
Definition 2: For ǫ > 0, a distributed optimization pro-
tocol Π is said to be (C, ǫ)-affine private if for every pair
of agents’ affine coefficients A = [α1, . . . , αn] and B =
[β1, . . . , βn] subject to the constraints:
αi = βi, ∀ i ∈ C, and
∑
i∈H
αi =
∑
i∈H
βi, (5)
the supports of ViewC(B) and ViewC(A) are identical, and
DKL (ViewC(A), ViewC(B)) ≤ ǫ‖A−B‖2. (6)
In other words, Definition 2 means that if Π is
(C, ǫ)-affine private then an adversary A cannot unambigu-
ously distinguish between two sets of agents’ affine coeffi-
cients A and B that are identical for the corrupted agents and
have identical sum over all honest agents (i.e., satisfy (5)).
Note that smaller is the value of ǫ, the more difficult it
is for A to distinguish between two sets of agents’ affine
coefficients satisfying (5), and hence stronger is the privacy.
In general, Definition 2 can be easily extended to define
privacy of higher degree polynomial terms, h†(x), of cost
function, as discussed in Section III-B. We remark that
Definition 2 makes sense even if |C| = n − 1, although it
is vacuous since revealing αH =
∑
i∈H αi reveals the affine
coefficients of the only honest agent’s cost function.
III. PROPOSED PROTOCOL AND PRIVACY GUARANTEE
In this section, we present the proposed Function Shar-
ing (FS) protocol and the formal privacy guarantee of the
protocol.
As mentioned earlier in Section I, the FS protocol consti-
tutes two phases. In the first phase, elaborated below, each
agent i uses a “zero-sum” secret sharing protocol to compute
an “effective cost function” h˜i(x) based on its private local
cost function hi(x). In the second phase, the agents use a
distributed optimization protocol, DGD, to solve the effective
optimization problem,
minimize
x∈Rm
n∑
i=1
h˜i(x). (7)
To present the details of the first phase or the “masking
phase” of the protocol we introduce some notation. The
underlying communication network between the n agents
is modeled by an undirected graph G = (V , E) where
V = {1, . . . , n} denotes the agents (indexed arbitrarily), and
the communication links between the agents are represented
by the set of edges E . As G is undirected, each edge e ∈ E
is represented by an unordered pair of agents. Specifically,
e = {i, j} ∈ E if and only if there is a communication link
between agents i and j. Let, Ni = {j ∈ V {i, j} ∈ E}
denote the set of neighbors of i.
The Masking Phase: In the Masking Phase of FS, each
agent i sends an independently chosen random vector rij to
each j ∈ Ni. The probability distribution of rij is Gaussian
with m-dimensional zero vector 0m as the mean and the
covariance matrix of σ2Im, where, Im is the m×m identity
matrix. It is denoted by,
rij ∼ N
(
0m, σ
2Im
)
, ∀ i ∈ V , j ∈ Ni (8)
Each agent i ∈ V then subtracts the sum of all the received
random vectors from the sum of all the transmitted random
numbers to compute the mask vector ui, i.e.,
ui =
∑
j∈Ni
(rji − rij), (9)
Then, each agent i ∈ V computes an effective cost function
h˜i(x) as follows:
h˜i(x) = hi(x) + u
T
i x, ∀x ∈ Rm. (10)
The above masking phase is summarized in Algorithm 1.
The Optimization Phase: In the second phase of the FS pro-
tocol, the agents run a non-private distributed optimization
algorithm, DGD, on their effective cost functions to solve
for the optimization problem (7). The correctness of this
approach is shown as follows.
Algorithm 1 Function Sharing (FS) Protocol
Input: Each agent i has cost function hi(x) and σ ∈ R.
Output: Minimizer, x∗ ∈ argminx∈Rm
∑n
i=1 hi(x)
♦ Phase 1: Masking of Cost Functions
Each agent i ∈ V executes:
1: Draws vectors rij independently for all j ∈ Ni and sends
rij to each agent j ∈ Ni. The p.d.f of rij is given by (8).
2: Compute the mask ui as per (9).
3: Compute the effective cost function h˜i(x) as per (10).
♦ Phase 2: Distributed Optimization
4: Agents execute DGD on local effective costs {h˜i(x)}i∈V
with non-summable but square summable learning rate.
Recall that G is an undirected graph and consequently,
n∑
i=1
ui =
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
(rji − rij) = 0.
This implies that, for all x ∈ Rm,
n∑
i=1
h˜i(x) =
n∑
i=1
hi(x) +
n∑
i=1
uTi x =
n∑
i=1
hi(x). (11)
The masking phase in the FS protocol preserves the sum
of the agents’ local private cost functions. Consequently,
solving (7) is equivalent to solving (1). However, observe
that effective cost functions h˜i(x) may be non-convex with a
convex aggregate
∑n
i=1 h˜i(x). The distributed optimization
algorithm employed in the second phase needs to be able
to minimize a convex sum of non-convex functions [14].
As discussed in Theorem 1 from [2], DGD satisfies this
requirement, provided the step-sizes are non-summable yet
square-summable and effective costs are Lipschitz smooth.
A. Privacy Guarantee
Next, we show privacy guarantee for affine terms of cost
functions in Theorem 1. Privacy of higher degree polynomial
terms in detailed in Section III-B.
If C denotes the set of corrupted agents and H = V \ C
is the set of honest agents, then GH denotes the residual
graph obtained by removing the agents in C, and the edges
incident to them, from G. Let LH denote the graph-Laplacian
of GH, and µ(LH) denote the second smallest eigenvalue of
LH. The eigenvalue µ(LH) is also commonly known as the
algebraic connectivity of the graph [15].
Theorem 1: If C is not a vertex cut of G, and the
affine coefficients of the agents’ private cost functions are
independent of each other, then the FS protocol is (C, ǫ)-
affine private, with ǫ = 1/(4σ2µ(LH)).
Theorem 1 implies that C not being a vertex cut1 of
G is sufficient for (C, ǫ)-affine privacy. Note that ǫ is a
quantitative measure of privacy. A smaller ǫ gives stronger
1A vertex cut is a set of vertices of a graph which, if removed – together
with any incident edges – disconnects the graph [15].
privacy. As is shown in Theorem 1, ǫ is inversely proportional
both to the variance σ2 of the elements of random vectors
rij ’s used in the first phase of the FS protocol and the
algebraic connectivity of the residual network topology GH.
This signifies that using random vectors of larger variances
(i.e., larger σ2) improves the privacy guarantee of the FS
protocol. Additionally, privacy is stronger if the residual
honest graph GH is densely connected.
We have the following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1: If G has (t + 1)-vertex connectivity, and
the affine coefficients of the agents’ private cost func-
tions are independent of each other, then for any C with
|C| ≤ t the FS protocol is (C, ǫ)-affine private where ǫ =
maxH 1/(4σ
2µ(LH)).
The (t + 1)−vertex connectivity sufficiency condition
above in tight, as it has been shown to be necessary for pri-
vacy (against at most t honest-but-curious corrupted agents)
for consensus based distributed gradient and subgradient
descent algorithms in [2], [16] and [17], respectively.
B. Privacy of Higher-Degree Polynomial Terms
The FS protocol presented in Algorithm 1 only protects
the privacy of affine coefficients of local cost functions, as
formally stated in Theorem 1. In what follows, we show an
easy extension to protect privacy of higher degree polynomial
terms of agents’ private cost functions.
Recall (2), similarly decompose hi(x) = h
(d)
i (x)+h
†
i (x),
where, h
(d)
i (x) is a polynomial function of maximum degree
d ≥ 1, and h†i (x) is the residual function. Specifically,
h
(d)
i (x) =
d∑
ℓ=1
α
(ℓ)
i x
ℓ + γi, ∀x.
Now, similar to the definition of (C, ǫ)−affine privacy we
define the privacy of the ℓ-th degree coefficients A(ℓ) =
[α
(ℓ)
1 , . . . , α
(ℓ)
n ] against a passive adversary that corrupts a
set of agents C.
Privacy Definition: For ǫ > 0 and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ d, protocol Π is
said to be preserve the (C, ǫ)-privacy of ℓ-th degree coeffi-
cients A(ℓ) if for every other set of ℓ-th degree coefficients
B = [β
(ℓ)
1 , . . . , β
(ℓ)
n ] subject to the constraints:
β
(ℓ)
i = α
(ℓ)
i , ∀ i ∈ C, and
∑
i∈H
β
(ℓ)
i =
∑
i∈H
α
(ℓ)
i ,
the support of ViewC(A
(ℓ)) & ViewC(B
(ℓ)) are identical, and
DKL
(
ViewC(A
(ℓ)), ViewC(B
(ℓ))
)
≤ ǫ‖A(ℓ) −Bℓ‖2.
Modified FS Protocol and Privacy Guarantee: In the first
phase, the agents mask the coefficients A(ℓ) independently
for each ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , d} in a similar manner as the masking
of the affine coefficients delineated in Algorithm 1 and
compute the effective cost functions. In the second phase,
agents run DGD over the effective cost functions. Theorem 1
readily implies that if C does not form a vertex cut of the
network topology G then the FS protocol, modified as above,
preserves the (C, ǫ)-privacy of ℓ-th degree coefficients A(ℓ)
for each ℓ, where, ǫ = 1/(4σ2µ(LH)).
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we present the formal proof for Theorem 1.
For doing so, we first present a few relevant observations.
Let L denote the graph-Laplacian of the network topology
G. As G is undirected, L is a diagonalizable matrix [15].
Specifically, there exists a unitary matrix M constituting
of the orthogonal eigenvectors of L such that2, L =
MDiag (µ1, . . . , µn)M
T where µ1 ≤ µ2 ≤ · · · ≤ µn are
the eigenvalues of L. When G is connected, µ1 = 0 and
µ2 > µ1 [15]. We denote the generalized inverse of L by
L†, defined as [18],
L† = MDiag (0, 1/µ2, . . . , 1/µn)MT (12)
For future usage, we denote the second smallest eigenvalue
of L, i.e., µ2, by µ(L). Let c be a positive real value,
then we denote by N †(0n, cL) the degenerate Gaussian
distribution [19]. Let 0n and 1n denote the zero and the one
vectors, respectively, of dimension n. When G is connected;
the rank of L is n − 1 [15], L 1n = 0n, and if a random
vector R ∼ N †(0n, cL) then [18]
fR(r) =
{
1√
det∗(2πcL)
exp
(
− rTL†r2c
)
, rT 1n = 0
0n, otherwise
(13)
where det∗(2πcL) = (2πc)n−1∏ni=2 µi. Henceforth, for a
vector v, vk denotes the k-th element of v unless otherwise
noted. For i ∈ V , recall that ui is the mask (see (9)). Let,
Uk =
[
uk1 , . . . , u
k
n
]T
, k = 1, . . . , m. (14)
be a n-dimensional vector comprising the k-th elements of
the masks computed by the agents in the first phase of the
FS protocol. For a random vector R, we denote its mean by
E(R) and its covariance matrix by Cov(R). Note,
Cov(r) = E (R− E(R)) (R− E(R))T .
For the FS protocol, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: If G is connected then, for k ∈ {1, . . . , m},
Uk ∼
{
N †
(
0n, 2σ
2L) , ∑ni=1 uki = 0
0n, otherwise
Proof: Assign an arbitrary order to the set of edges, i.e.,
let E = (e1, . . . , e|E|) where each ei represents an undirected
edge in the graph G. For each edge el where l ∈ {1, . . . , |E|},
we define a vector θel of size |V| whose i-th element denoted
by θiel is given as follows:
θiel =

1 if el = {i, j} and i < j
−1 if el = {i, j} and i > j
0 otherwise.
We define an oriented incidence matrix Θ of dimension |V|×
|E| as Θ = [θe1 , . . . , θe|E|] (see [15] for definition of Θ).
2Diag(y1, . . . yn) is a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries
y1, . . . , yn.
For an edge e = {i, j} with i < j, we define
ce = rji − rij . (15)
Since the each random vector in {rij , i, j ∈ V} is identically
and independently distributed (i.i.d. ) by a normal distribution
N(0m, σ
2Im), (15) implies that for each edge el the random
vector cel is i.i.d. as N(0, 2σ
2Im). Therefore, for each k,
the random variable ckel has normal distribution ofN(0, 2σ
2).
Let, Ck = [cke1 , c
k
e2
, · · · , cke|E| ]T . For two distinct edges e and
e′, the random vectors ce and ce′ are independent. Therefore,
E(Ck)(Ck)T = 2σ2I|E| (16)
where I|E| is the |E| × |E| identity matrix. Moreover,
from (9),
Uk = ΘCk, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , m}. (17)
As the mean of Ck is zero for all k, the above implies that
the mean of Uk is zero for all k. From (16), we obtain,
Cov(Uk) = Θ
(
E(Ck)(Ck)T
)
ΘT = 2σ2 ΘΘT .
Note that L = ΘΘT [15]. Substituting this above implies,
Cov(Uk) = 2σ2L. (18)
As G is assumed connected, L 1n = 0n. Substituting the
above in (13) proves the lemma.
Now, by utilizing the above lemma, we show that knowl-
edge of the effective cost functions generated in the FS
protocol does not provide significant information about the
affine coefficients of the agents’ private cost functions.
We consider two possible executionsEA and EB of the FS
protocol such that affine coefficients of the agents’ effective
cost functions in both executions is
A˜ = [α˜1, . . . , α˜n] (19)
In execution EA, the agents have private cost functions with
affine coefficients A = [α1, . . . , αn], and in execution EB ,
the agents have private cost functions with affine coefficients
B = [β1, . . . , βn]. Let fA˜|A and fA˜|B denote the conditional
p.d.f.s of A˜ given that the affine coefficients of the agents’
private cost functions are A and B, respectively.
Lemma 2: If G is connected, and ∑ni=1 αi = ∑ni=1 βi,
then supports of f
A˜|A and fA˜|B are identical, and
DKL
(
f
A˜|A, fA˜|B
)
≤ 1
4σ2µ(L)‖A−B‖
2 . (20)
Proof: Let, A˜k and Ak denote the column vectors
representing the k-th rows of the effective affine coefficeints
A˜ and the actual affine coefficients A, respectively. That is,
A˜k =
[
α˜k1 , . . . , α˜
k
n
]T
and Ak =
[
αk1 , . . . , α
k
n
]T
. The proof
comprises three parts.
Part I: Recall from (9), α˜ki = α
k
i + u
k
i for all i and k.
Therefore (see (14) for the notation Uk), A˜k = Ak + Uk.
As Uk is independent of Ak for every k, we get,
f
A˜k|A(α˜
k
1 , . . . , α˜
k
n) = fUk
(
A˜k −Ak
)
. (21)
Therefore, from Lemma 1, if
∑n
i=1 α˜
k
i =
∑n
i=1 α
k
i then
f
A˜k|Ak(α˜
k
1 , . . . , α˜
k
n) =
1√
det∗(4πσ2L) exp
(
− (A˜
k −Ak)TL†(A˜k −Ak)
4σ2
)
(22)
Else if
∑n
i=1 α˜
k
i 6=
∑n
i=1 α
k
i then
f
A˜k|Ak(α˜
k
1 , . . . , α˜
k
n) = 0, (23)
For A and B as stated in the Lemma, (22) and (23) imply
that the supports of conditional p.d.f.s f
A˜k|A and fA˜k|B are
identical.
Part II: From (22),
log
f
A˜k|A(α˜
k
1 , . . . , α˜
k
n)
f
A˜k|B(α˜
k
1 , . . . , α˜
k
n)
=
1
4σ2
×{
(A˜k −Ak)TL†(A˜k −Ak)− (A˜k −Bk)TL†(A˜k −Bk)
}
This implies that
log
f
A˜k|A(α˜
k
1 , . . . , α˜
k
n)
f
A˜k|B(α˜
k
1 , . . . , α˜
k
n)
=
(Ak −Bk)TL†(2A˜k −Ak −Bk)
4σ2
Let s = A˜k −Ak. Then, the above implies,
DKL
(
f
A˜k|A, fA˜k|B
)
=
1
4σ2
∫
s∈Rn
(Ak −Bk)TL†(2s+Ak −Bk)fak(s) ds =
1
2σ2
(Ak −Bk)TL†E(ak) + 1
4σ2
(Ak −Bk)TL†(Ak −Bk)
From Lemma 1, E(ak) = 0n. Therefore,
DKL
(
f
A˜k|A, fA˜k|B
)
=
1
4σ2
(Ak −Bk)TL†(Ak −Bk)
Recall, 1Tn (A
k − Bk) = 0n. As G is assumed connected,
rank(L†) = n − 1 and L1n = 0n. Substituting from (12)
above implies that [20],
DKL
(
f
A˜k|A, fA˜k|B
)
≤ ‖A
k −Bk‖2
4σ2µ(L) . (24)
Part III: For k 6= l, Uk, U l are independent of each other.
From (21),
f
A˜|A =
m∏
k=1
f
A˜|A , and similarly, fA˜|B =
m∏
k=1
f
A˜|B .
From the property of KL-divergence, the above implies that
DKL
(
f
A˜|A, fA˜|B
)
=
m∑
k=1
DKL(fA˜k|A, fA˜k|B).
Using (24) to the above expression completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1. Recall, C denotes the set of corrupted
agents and H = V \ C is the set of honest agents. Let EC
denote the set of edges incident to C and EH = E \ EC is the
set of edges incident only on the honest agents. The residual
honest graph is GH = (H, EH). If C is not a vertex cut of G
then GH is connected. The proof comprises two parts.
Part I: We first determine the view of the passive adversary
(see Definition 1):
• Trivially, both the corrupted agents’ private and effective
cost functions, i.e., {hi(x), h˜i(x), i ∈ C}, belong to A’s
view.
• From the first phase, the collection of random vectors
RC = {rij , {i, j} ∈ EC} is contained in the view of A.
• In the second phase, the agents execute DGD algorithm on
their effective cost functions to solve problem (7). In the
worst-case scenario, the algorithm executed in the second
phase may reveal each agent’s effective cost function to
A. Therefore, we let effective cost functions of all honest
agents {h˜i, i ∈ H} to be a part of the adversary’s view.
Therefore, the adversary’s view comprises; {hi(x), i ∈ C},
RC , and the effective cost functions {h˜i(x), i ∈ V}.
Let A and A˜ denote the true and the effective affine
coefficient matrices of the agents, respectively, as defined
in (4) and (19). From the above deduction of the adversary’s
view, the probability distribution
ViewC(A) = fA˜, RC A . (25)
where notation f
A˜, RC A
denotes the conditional joint
p.d.f. of A˜H and RC given the value of A. Let, A˜C =
[α˜i, i ∈ C] be the affine coefficients of the effective costs
of the corrupted agents C, and A˜H = [α˜i i ∈ H] be the
affine coefficients of the effective costs of the honest agents
H. As the values of the random vectors A˜C and RC are
deterministically known to the adversary, (25) implies that
ViewC(A) = fA˜H A . (26)
Let, Ci = Ni ∩ C, ∀i ∈ H, and AH = [αi, i ∈ H] be affine
coefficients of the honest agents’ private costs. From (9),
α˜i = αi +
∑
j∈Ni\Ci
(rij − rji) +
∑
j∈Ci
(rij − rji). (27)
Let, αi = αi +
∑
j∈Ni\Ci
(rij − rji), ∀i ∈ H, and, AH =
[αi, i ∈ H]. Note that the values of α˜i and
∑
j∈Ci
(rij−rji)
are deterministically known to the adversary. (26) together
with (27) implies that
ViewC(A) = fAH A. (28)
Part II: Consider an alternate set of the affine coefficients
of honest agents’ private cost functions BH = [βi, i ∈ H]
such that
∑
i∈H βi =
∑
i∈H αi. Now, from Lemma 2 we
obtain that if
∑
i∈H αi =
∑
i∈H βi =
∑
i∈H αi, then the
supports of the conditional probability distributions fAH|AH
and fAH|BH are identical, and
DKL
(
fAH|AH , fAH|BH
)
≤ 1
4σ2µ(LH)‖AH −BH‖
2.
Let B = [β1, . . . , βn] denote the alternate affine coefficients
of all the agents such that the honest agents’ affine coeffi-
cients in A and B are equal to AH and BH, respectively, and
αi = βi for all i ∈ C. As the affine coefficients of the agents
are assumed independent of each other, fAH|AH = fAH|A,
and similarly, fAH|BH = fAH|B . Substituting from (28) in
the above argument we obtain that the supports of ViewC(A)
and ViewC(B) are identical, and
DKL (ViewC(A), ViewC(B)) ≤ 1
4σ2µ(LH)‖AH −BH‖
2.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have proposed a protocol, named the Function Sharing
or FS protocol, for protecting statistical privacy of the agents’
costs in distributed optimization, against a passive adversary
that corrupts some of the agents in the network. The FS
protocol is shown to preserve the statistical privacy of the
polynomial terms of the honest agents’ private costs if the
corrupted agents do not constitute a vertex cut of the network.
Moreover, the FS protocol accurately computes the solution
of original optimization problem.
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